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REGULATION OF INTERSTATE LAND
SALES: IS FULL DISCLOSURE
SUFFICIENT?
RENEE M. FPJEDMAN*
Over twenty million people have purchased lots in subdivided
land' as an investment or second residence.2 Recent statistics indi-
cate that the number of such purchases will continue to increase.
3
Typically, lot sales of subdivided land reap immense profits for spec-
ulators and developers.4 Yet, buyers find the enterprise far from sat-
isfying when promoters misrepresent qualities of a lot or fail to
B.A., Northwestern University, 1976; J.D., Washington University, 1980.
I. P. SIMKO, 3 PROMISED LANDS: SUBDIVISIONS AND THE LAW 3 (1978) [herein-
after cited as P. SIMKO].
2. See For Sale. Bad Deals in Land, CHANGING TIMES, Aug., 1977, at 13. Histor-
ically, experts considered investment in undeveloped land safe and profitable. Now,
such practices are risky. See Train, Investing in Land, FORBES, Mar. 20, 1978, at 104.
3. Compare 1973 Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), STA-
TISTICAL YEARBOOK with statistics given for 1977 and 1978 in Letter from Henderson,
Director Policy Development & Control Div., Office of Interstate Land Sales Regis-
tration (OILSR) to Renee Friedman (Feb. 14, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Henderson
Letter]. See also PLUS, May, 1979, at 16.
Huge corporations have entered into the land development business, greatly in-
creasing the number of subdivisions available for lot sales. To maintain profit levels,
companies continue to create more subdivisions. TASK FORCE ON LAND USE & UR-
BAN GROWTH OF CITIZENS' ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
THE USE OF LAND, A CITIZEN'S POLICY GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH 69 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as TASK FORCE ON LAND USE].
4. Many millionaires started as land speculators. Profit margins are so large that
several hundred dollars may be spent to market a single lot. See M. PAULSON, THE
GREAT LAND HUSTLE 4, 101 (1972). The minimum mark-up on many lots is 2,000%.
Land Sales Boom-Let the Buyer Beware, 37 CONSUMER REP. 606 (1972).
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provide necessary capital improvements.' Traditional real estate law
offers little help to the consumer who falls prey to slick salespeople
peddling poor deals.' Unfortunately, the principle of caveal emplor,
or "buyer beware,"7 justifies this hands-off policy towards consumer
problems and continues to influence the development of real estate
law.
When Congress passed the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure
Act8 (ILSFDA) in 1968, few remedies protected the consumer from
deceptive and fraudulent sales.9 Promulgated only after extensive
publicity of consumer abuse10 and years of congressional hearings, t t
the Act attempts to provide consumers with accurate information rel-
5. Breakdown of consumer complaints received by the Qtfice of Interstate Land
Sales Registration (OILSR):
a. oral misrepresentation-37%
b. failure to provide improvements-28%
c. failure to provide property report-10%
d. use of sales pitch for investment-10%
e. alteration of contracts-6%
f. failure to deliver deed-5%
g. failure to provide promised gifts-4%
Henderson Letter, supra note 3. In 1979, OILSR received approximately 16,300 con-
sumer complaints, inquiries and developer responses. Phone conversation with Chris
Peterson, OILSR (Mar. 28, 1980).
The swindled include blue collar workers as well as various professionals. See In
Pursuit of the Second Home, NEWSWEEK, April 17, 1972, at 84. See generally A.
WOLFF, UNREAL ESTATE (1973).
6. See P. SIMKO, supra note 1, at 9-31.
7. The maxim of ["buyer beware"] applies forcibly in this case. . . .Whatever
morality may require, it is too much for commerce to require that the vendor
should see for the purchaser. It is enough for him, in point of law, that he does
not conceal the knowledge of secret defects, nor give a warranty ...
Sherwood v. Salmon, 2 Day 128, 136 (Conn. 1805).
Stoic epistemology, the theoretical basis for Anglo-Saxon law, provides reason for
the "buyer beware" principles. All men, according to Stoic philosophy, possess ra-
tionality and have a moral obligation to exercise it. Thus, man bears responsibility
for each of his actions and decisions and must accept blame if he fails to correctly use
his rationality. See G. Dorsey, Jurisculture (1973) (unpublished student materials,
Washington University School of Law).
8. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1700-1720 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
9. See Young, Land Sales and Development: Some Legal and Conceptual Consid.
erations, 3 REAL EST. L.J. 44, 46 (1974). Common law actions in fraud and deceit
were very difficult to prove. Id State laws failed to adequately rectify the problem.
Armbrister, Land Frauds: Look Before You Buy, SAT. EVEN. POST, April 27, 1903, at
17, 22.
10. See M. PAULSON, supra note 4, at 5.
11. E.g., Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Frauds and Misrepresentations
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evant to the purchase decision. 2 Additionally, ILSFDA includes
consumer redress for failure to receive requisite information. 13
Operating under the assumption that consumers automatically
reach rational decisions when presented with adequate information,
the Act's drafters, consistent with the caveat emptor philosophy, in-
cluded no substantive regulations. 4 They believed that the market,
perfected by regulations requiring disclosure, would insure wise con-
sumer purchases and environmentally sound uses of land. 15 Under
this framework, no additional controls to protect consumers or insure
non-destructive land development are justifiable.'6
Despite these presuppositions, the present number of complaints
received by the Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration 7
(OILSR), coupled with the Act's limited scope, reveal ILSFDA's in-
.Affecting the Elderly of the Senate Special Comm on Aging, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 343
(1964).
12. See 15 U.S.C. § 1707 (1976). See also notes 78-96 and accompanying text
infra, for discussion of provisions.
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 1709 (1976 and Supp. III 1979) (creates civil liabilities for
fraud and failure to provide requisite information). See also Note, Interstate Land
Sales Regulation: The Casefor an Expanded Federal Role, 6 U. MICH. J. L. RF. 511,
512 (1972).
14. See Note, The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 21 RUTGERS L. REv.
714, 717 (1967). The Act patterns itself after the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (1976 & Supp. III 1979), which contains no substantive regulations.
Gandal, General Outline of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 3 REAL EST.
L. J. 3, 4 (1974). Cf. SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE 1933 & 1934 ACTS (The Wheat Report, CCH
1969) (the purpose of full disclosure in relation to the sale of securities is to provide
information basic to rational decisions).
15. See Coffey & Welch, Federal Regulation of Land Sales: Full Disclosure Comes
Down to Earth, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 5, 50-70 (1969).
Opponents of government regulation believe that no justification exists for regula-
tions requiring provision of information. Sellers of superior products will accordingly
disseminate information concerning the frauds of their competitors in an attempt to
get ahead. When there is an absence of such information, theorists rationalize that
the market is acting to balance the cost of disclosure with the potential benefit ensuing
from disclosure. Government regulation often forces uneconomical disclosure in
cases where the need does not counterbalance the cost. See Pitofsky, Beyond Nader:
Consumer Protection and the Regulation ofAdvertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661, 663,
667 (1977).
16. See Coffey & Welch, supra note 15, at 18.
17. See 24 C.F.R. § 1700-1715 (1980), establishing the OILSR as the administra-
tive office within HUD.
INFORM, a New York public interest group, reports that OILSR receives approxi-
mately 3,000 consumer complaints per year. See P. SiMKo, supra note 1, at 4.
1980]
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adequacies. Full disclosure does not always guarantee optimal
purchase decisions. Any adequate solution to the land sales problem,
therefore, apparently necessitates substantive federal regulations.
18
By examining the legislative goals and comparing them to the actual
operation of the Act, this Note will identify the Act's deficiencies and
suggest methods of improvement.
I. THE SUBDIVISION PROBLEM
Congress enacted ILSFDA to remedy the adverse effects suffered
by consumers when land was subdivided. t9 Unscrupulous develop-
ers exploited consumers by omitting or misrepresenting material facts
concerning lot characteristics, promised improvements, and terms of
sale.20
A. Environmental Problems
Land use plans in the United States typically fail to pay sufficient
heed to large areas of virgin land."1 Further, where a local govern-
ment has no land use plan, developers can easily obtain permits to
18. See generally P. SIMKO, supra note 1, at 430.
Employment of substantive environmental standards indirectly aids the consumer
who bears the cost of poor subdivision planning through decreased value and expend-
itures for improvements necessary to correct damages. Id at 475. See generally Case
& Jester, Securities Regulations of Interstate Land Sales and Real Estate Develop-
ment-A Blue SkyAdministrator's Viewpoint (pts. 1-2), 7 URB. LAW. 215, 385 (1975).
Given its record over the past ten years, the Act cannot achieve perfect information
or force consumers to act on the facts disclosed. It therefore fails to prevent unwise
purchases by consumers.
The market fails to account for variables such as consumer and environmental ef-
fects (te., externalities). Market responses in subdivision developing that do not ac-
count for such external factors are not completely rational, thus are undeserving of
reliance. Cf. Mandelker, Control of Competition as a Proper Purpose in Zoning, UR-
BAN LAND USE POLICY: THE CENTRAL CITY 23 (R. Andrews ed. 1972) (analogous
application of ideas to zoning controls).
19. See Note, Interstate Land Sales Regulation, 1974 WASH. U. L.Q. 123, 125.
Congress hoped the legislation would protect the land sales industry which had suf-
fered adverse publicity. Id An estimated 85% of all developers operate legitimate
businesses. A small minority of con artists have injured the entire industry's reputa-
tion. See Armbrister, supra note 9, at 17.
20. See P. SIMKO, supra note 1, at 430. See also Armbrister, supra note 9, at 18
(misrepresented sales have occurred in Arizona, New Mexico, Oregon, Florida, Pan-
ama, Costa Rica, and Brazil).
21. See Case & Jester, supra note 18, at 395-400. Many lots were in the middle of
nowhere, without neighboring residents, shopping facilities, schools, etc.
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subdivide.22 All too often, lack of protective foresight by local gov-
ernments creates premature subdivisions with their attendant
problems.23 Developers frequently divide lots into grid patterns
without considering what would be best suited to future develop-
ment.
24
Physical and environmental constraints, not considered by devel-
opers' plans, traditionally frustrated the provision of improvements
when circumstances required more expensive alternative facilities.2"
If developers were unable to finance these additional costs, buyers
who had completed payments found themselves with an uninhabit-
able tract of vacant land, very different from the retirement or vaca-
tion paradise of their dreams;26 unsuitable lands typically create dead
subdivisions. Usually, developers divided tracts into very small
parcels rendering them useless for farming or other alternative future
development. Since ownership was so fragmented, there was little
chance of reassembling title to a tract large enough to develop effi-
ciently.28 Inflated prices incident to developers' huge profits also less-
ened the probability of later development since it was too costly to
buy the land from others.2 9 Uninhabited subdivisions would lay fal-
22. Id.
23. The contractual covenants provided the buyer with rights; the consumer, how-
ever, could rarely recover any damages. The developer had either gone out of busi-
ness or moved to another state and could not receive service of process, necessary for
institution of a civil suit. E.g., GAC, at one time one of the largest land sales corpora-
tions in the country, declared bankruptcy in 1976. See P. SIMKO, supra note 1, at 49.
This incident occurred following a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) order to reim-
burse dissatisfied customers. Financing for improvements usually depends upon the
success of the selling campaign as pooled purchase money pays development costs.
Insufficient sales receipts caused many developers to disband capital development.
24. See generally note I supra.
25. See A. WOLFF, supra note 5, at 204.
26. See Armbrister, supra note 9, at 18. See also A. WOLFF, supra note 5, at 275.
Most of these purchases occur without benefit of an attorney to point out title defects
to the unwary buyer.
27. See TASK FORCE ON LAND USE, supra note 3, at 103. England has a strict
planning system for vacant spaces due to high demand for land. Id
28. Speculators acquire large tracts of undeveloped land and divide them into lots
prior to market demand, confident that demand will occur in response to growing
needs. This process occurs without fault where plans exist to 1) anticipate future land
needs, 2) limit the number of lots made available to foster efficiency in developing
capital improvements, and 3) prevent flooding the market. See A. WOLFF, supra note
5, at 15.
29. "Of all men's activities, his use of the land has the most far-reaching impact
." Id at 58. Damage to land may far outweigh the loss suffered by individual
19801
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low, subject to erosion3" and sedimentation in bodies of water.31
Even improved subdivisions suffered the ill effects of the develop-
ment process on the environment. The problems included erosion
and disruption of food chains,32 as well as air3 3 and water pollu-
tion.34 Additionally, water treatment facilities often inadequately
met the needs of the growing residential community intended for the
subdivision site.35
B. Consumer Problems
Many buyers who acquired land without prior inspection later
learned that they owned homesites on rocky hillsides, flood plains, or
undrained swamps. 6 In several instances, despite marketing efforts
advertising lots as future homes, contracts failed to provide for neces-
sary improvements such as utilities, sewer systems, and roads.37 Fre-
quently, developers could not finance the completion of such
improvements even if the contract promised their provision.38 Con-
sumers could then either abandon the idea of using the lot as a
homesite, or could finance costly improvements themselves, notwith-
standing that the purchase price purportedly included these develop-
consumers. The effects of poor land use practices indirectly affect millions of people.
See M. PAULSON, supra note 4, at 5.
30. See A. WOLFF, supra note 5, at 10.
31. Lot value depends upon the facilities provided by the improvement associa-
tion which was typically controlled by the seller. See Comment, State Securities Law:
.4 Valuable Toolfor Regulating Investment Land Sales, 7 N.M. L. REv. 265, 267
(1977).
32. See generally A. WOLFF, supra note 5.
33. See TASK FoRCE ON LAND USE, supra note 3, at 275-76.
34. With land titles scattered, towns are unable to plan for their own growth. If
few owners reside in the subdivison, problems arise from their demand for commu-
nity services and capital improvements. The sparse population and development pat-
terns provide an inadequate tax base to support such endeavors. Often there is little
or no industrial development to contribute money to localities via property taxes. See
A. WOLFF, supra note 5, at 71.
35. Id at 73. The companies that provide improvements as well as those which
offer only raw land realize approximately 85% of their profit from lot sales. Id at 71.
36. Id at 190.
37. See TASK FORCE ON LAND UsE, supra note 3, at 277.
38. Vegetation and wildlife have often suffered as a result of incompletion. Id at
190.
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mental costs.
39
Other clever developers took advantage of the "special service dis-
trict concept" whereby a quasi-governmental body sold bonds,
backed by assets in the district, to pay for capital improvements.
Before developers sold their lots, they obtained approval of bond is-
suers to cover the cost of improvements. Once selling lots to unsus-
pecting buyers, the special service district levied assessments to repay
the debt, holding liens against all property in the district.4" As a re-
sult of the precarious financial situation of many developers, title
problems occurred. Banks which lent money to capitalize a selling
endeavor retained security interests in the subdivision properties.
Due to the encumbrance, subsequent lot purchasers could not claim
clear title to the lots on which they had put money down.4 1
Despite the myriad of problems arising from subdivision sales,
consumers have continued to invest money in lot purchases. High
pressure sales techniques typified marketing of subdivision lots.
Seeking huge profit margins, salespeople zealously recruited custom-
ers with fast talk, empty promises, fancy dinners and free gifts.4 2
Persuasive sellers possessed an overbearing influence upon a
buyer's ability to determine whether the purchase fit his or her needs
and expectations.4 Stressing the historic profitability of land as an
investment,4 promoters, inadequately trained as investment counsel-
ors,4 consulted lists to pick targets for their sales pitches.46 Promot-
ers downplayed the high risks that participation in their deals
39. Dust dislodged by carving grid divisions into the land has caused air pollu-
tion, See A. WOLFF, supra note 5, at 190.
40. Fertilizers, oil products, and detergents create water pollution. Id at 3 1. Bad
planning has ruined water tables which once supplied fresh water. See Armbrister,
supra note 9, at 82.
41 See Mischone & Michael. Private Lot Ownership at the Lake of Egypt in South-
ern Illinois, 8 DEPT. OF FORESTRY, SCH. OF AGRICULTURE 12 (Southern Ill. Univ.,
Jan. 1972).
42. See TASK FORCE ON LAND USE, supra note 3, at 82.
43. See Case & Jester, supra note 18, at 401-02.
44. "Americans have greatly exaggerated notions about what land is worth." A.
WOLFF, supra note 5, at 61. Consistent with caveat emptor is "the notion that any-
body who gets cheated in a land deal has only himself to blame." TASK FORCE ON
LAND USE, supra note 3, at 158. See also note 4 and accompanying text supra.
45 Generally, states do not require special training for sales pesonnel. Many sell-
ers are incapable of answering reasonable investor questions. See Case & Jester,
supra note 18, at 401-02.
46, Id
1980]
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entailed.47 Many sellers neglected to mention that the specific lots
sold represented an extremely speculative undertaking.48 Because a
buyer rarely considered significant negative factors, the purchase de-
cision did not evidence a buyer's true desire to buy the specific land.
Instead, an artificial demand occurred, causing inflated prices.4 9
Offering easy credit terms, sellers convinced those who tradition-
ally believed they could not afford a second home to buy land.50
Long-term installment contracts and small monthly payments cre-
ated a market among people in the middle-income bracket. 5 Risks
shifted from the development industry to the buyer since under an
installment contract, transfer of title does not occur until the buyer
has completed all payments. Although a buyer may have diligently
made payments when due, the absence of performance bonds or es-
crow accounts left the buyer with little more than an empty lot if the
developer failed to complete improvements and went bankrupt.5 2
Promoters failed to mention the effects of liquidated damage clauses;
misled buyers later discovered that upon any default in payment they
forfeited ownership of the lot regardless of the amount already
paid.5 3
Incident to the foregoing practices, consumers lost substantial
amounts of money. Prior to passage of ILSFDA, existing means of
policing the land industry failed to solve the problems. Self-regula-
tion by the industry was unsuccessful,54 as were efforts by various
47. See TASK FORCE ON LAND USE, supra note 3, at 178.
48. See P. SIMKO, supra note 1, at 430. Developers divide large tracts into large
numbers of lots, thereby flooding the market. Without the high pressure marketing
procedures of the developer firms, the lone consumer is lucky to get a fraction of the
purchase price upon sale.
Left unimproved by the developer, land lies wasted and the consumer loses money.
See Case & Jester, supra note 18, at 408.
49. Although demand usually is a legitimate pricing factor, artificial demand does
not elicit true value. Buyers think of the purchase as an investment, and therefore do
not take the care they would normally in buying a home. Developers employ emo-
tional appeals to impede buyers' rational judgment. See P. SIMKO, supra note 1, at
27-34.
50. Id at 430.
51. Id
52. Installment sales contracts are not deeds; they do not transfer ownership or
rights to use land. See generally Warren, Calfornia Installment Land Sales Contracts.-
A Tmefor Reform, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 608 (1962).
53. See generally Case & Jester, supra note 18.
54. There is no counterpart to the National Association of Security Dealers
(Vol. 20:137
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consumer and public interest groups.5 Existing legal remedies were
ineffective; common law failed to require developers to diligently dis-
close significant information56 and diverse state laws provided insuf-
ficient protection.5 ' Local governments, responsible for subdivision
regulation, were ill-equipped to formulate complex master plans
needed for control, nor could they adequately oversee developer op-
erations. 8 Supreme Court decisions allowed broad interpretation of
remedial securities laws,59 but governments seldom enforced these
regulations60 to prohibit fraudulent land sales.
6
'
(NASD) for the land sales industry to establish disciplinary action and standards of
conduct for promoters. As a result, voluntary compliance is much more difficult to
achieve. See Case & Jester, supra note 18, at 440.
55. Eg., The Better Business Bureau spent years cautioning potential land buyers.
See M. PAULSON, supra note 4, at 5.
56. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 651 (1972). See also Coffey & Welch, supra
note 15. at 337.
57. Each state provided different protections-some lax and others aggressive-
creating a need for uniformity. Compare N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW § 3-0301 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1977) with ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30 §§ 371-389 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1979).
58. See Comment, supra note 31, at 268.
59. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967); SEC v. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293, 299 (1946). Broad interpretation of the definition of a security is necessary
beause of the variety of schemes devised to reap profits at the expense of others which
the securities laws are intended to regulate. Id
60. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa, 78a (1976).
61. No "investment contract" is involved when a person invests in real estate
with the hope perhaps of earning a profit as the result of a general increase in
values concurrent with the development of the neighborhood, as long as he does
not do so as part of an enterprise whereby it is expressly or impliedly understood
that the property will be developed or operated by others.
L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 491 (2d ed. 1961).
The nature of the underlying realty purchase does not warrant protection as an
investment security. Real property's intrinsic market value apart from the risk of the
developer's enterprise seems to be the major differential between land deals and "se-
curities." In contrast, market value is inextricably tied to the risk of the venture in
traditional securities transactions. Contra, SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946)
(an intangible interest need not be found for a security to exist). Professor Coffey
explains the failure of courts to accept subdivision lot sales as securities by saying that
the buyer cannot at the same time receive the full quidpro quo and place value at the
risk of an enterprise. See Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security's Is There a
More Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. RES. L. REv. 367, 387 (1967).
The courts' attitudes in excluding subdivision sales from the definition of a security
does not give sufficient weight to the economic realities involved in the transaction,
which indicate that the risks taken by subdivision pruchasers and their initial motiva-
tion to buy are very similar to those of investors in traditional securities. Id at 412.
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II. PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
A. Purpose
Proponents of corrective legislation recognized the need for in-
creased anti-fraud and full disclosure legislation, believing the securi-
ties law model to be the most effective form of remediation.62
Hearings revealed that Congress intended ILSFDA to be coextensive
with federal securities legislation. 63 Expressing his opinion during
the Senate hearings, the Commissioner of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) stated that furnishing buyers with written
information would adequately protect them.64 Optimism with re-
spect to the legislation, patterned after the Securities Act of 1933,65
prevented legislators from seeing the need for further substantive reg-
ulation.66
Although Congress modeled ILSFDA after securities law in recog-
nition of the analogous problems between purchases of securities and
land,67 the SEC received no authority to administer the new law.
Rather, Congress established the Office of Interstate Land Sales Re-
gistration,68 within the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD), to do so.
62. See generally Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Frauds d Misrepresen-
tations Affecting the Elderly of the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. 343 (1964). "[F]alse communication, including the failure to communicate, is
the most dangerous ... and the most feared art of human society." Green, The Com-
municative Torts, 54 TEx. L. REV. 1, 9 (1975).
63. For a full discussion of the legislative history of the ILSFDA, see Coffey &
Welch, supra note 15.
64. The legislature adopted Louis Brandeis' optimism in the powers of full disclo-
sure to cure all evils: "Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants, electric light the
most efficient policeman." The law was not made, he indicated, to prevent people
from making bad bargains. See generally L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY,
AND How BANKERS USE IT (1933).
65. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
66. Aside from belief in the benefits of full disclosure, the entactment of substan-
tive regulation was impeded by the American Land Developers Association (ALDA),
which lobbied strongly against meaningful legislation. See generally TASK FORCE ON
LAND USE, supra note 3.
67. Buyers may give money to others in order to gain profit and thereby subject
themselves to risks out of their direct control. The buyer does not have the same
degree of access to information as the seller. Further, in many instances, land devel-
opers, as security sellers, use the purchase price to finance the enterprise.
68. See 15 U.S.C. § 1715(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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B. Scope
The Act does not offer protection for all actions within the entire
land sales industry. Jurisdiction under the Act depends on the use of
interstate instrumentalities69 in connection with the sale, although the
actual misstatement upon which a suit is based need not occur by
such means.7 0  Regulations exempt wholly intrastate offerings,
71
however, regardless of whether or not the developer relied on inter-
state instrumentalities.
The Act's protection is further limited in that it applies only to
developers selling or leasing totally undeveloped land72 pursuant to a
common promotional plan. A subdivision must contain at least fifty
lots and each lot must contain less than five acres of land.73 If a
purchaser personally makes an inspection of the land and it is free
and clear of all liens and encumbrances, or if a buyer purchases for
business reasons, the Act exempts the sale from coverage.74
The ILSFDA does not provide liability for all persons involved in
the selling transaction. 75 Although Congress rejected holding "con-
trolling" persons liable, the Act retains aider and abettor liability
similar to that under federal securities law.76 For the Act to be mean-
69. See 15 U.S.C. § 1703(a) (1976 & Supp. I1 1979).
70. See Bongratz v. W.L. Belvidere, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 27, 30 (N.D. IIl. 1976). As
under the Securities Act, it is sufficient to prove jurisdiction by showing minimal use
of interstate communications. Commodore Prop., Inc. v. Hills, 417 F. Supp. 1388,
1390 (D. Neb. 1976).
71. See 24 C.F.R. § 1710.14(a)(2)(iii) (1980).
72. According to the Act, undeveloped land is unimproved land with no buildings
or contracts obligating the construction of any structures within two years. See 15
U.S.C. § 1702(a)(3) (1976).
73. Id §§ 1701(3), 1702(a)(2). The Ninth Circuit qualified this provision in De
Luz Ranchos Inv., Ltd. v. Coldwell Banker & Co., 608 F. 2d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir.
1979), holding that the exemption is not applicable if some lots in the same subdivi-
sion contain less than five acres and some more.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(9), (10) (1976). Other exemptions include the sale of land
by either the government or a real estate investment trust. See id § 1702 (6), (7).
75. See, e.g., Paquin v. Four Seasons of Tenn., Inc., 519 F.2d 1105, 1111 (5th Cir.
1975) (salesman who had no selling authority, but whose name appeared on the sales
contract and received 9% commission was not held liable beause he was not the actual
seller); Adema v. Great Northern Dev. Co., 374 F. Supp. 318 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (lender
financing purchase of land is not liable, notwithstanding plaintiffs allegation that
lender participated in a joint venture with developer); Konopisos v. Phillips, 30 N.C.
App. 209, 226 S.E.2d 522 (1976) (Act is not applicable to purchasers' assignee).
76. See Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 406 (N.D. M1l. 1977) (banks liable
under Act if they participate in and aid the advancement of the fraudulent scheme).
1980]
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ingful, it must make fraudulent planners and profiteers liable."
C. Requirements and Prohibitions
The Act requires that sellers prepare and distribute accurate prop-
erty reports to all purchasers78 and file detailed statements of record
with the OILSR.79 These provisions insure that purchasers receive
pertinent information otherwise unavailable, concerning such facts as
condition of title, developer's financial ability to execute the develop-
ment scheme, conditions of sale, risk factors, limitations on land use,
and encumbrances attached to the property.80 The ILSFDA requires
developers to specifically describe the state of capital improvements
by demanding information concerning the number of dwellings al-
ready sold and expected to be sold, and the availability and cost of
paved roads, water, sewage, public utilities or their alternatives, and
safety factors.8 '
Although the Act requires a developer to submit enough informa-
tion for HUD to evaluate the nature of the offering, the disclosure is
neither exhaustive nor comprehensive. Regardless of the project's
soundness, registration automatically becomes effective thirty days
after the developer files the information with OILSR unless the Sec-
retary determines that the statements are incomplete or inaccurate.8 2
An unprofitable or risky deal does not constitute sufficient grounds
for refusing registration.
The Act prohibits the use of false or misleading statements in ei-
ther OILSR-required reports or in connection with other material in-
formation relied upon by the purchaser. To deter developers from
Butsee Bartholomew v. Northampton Natl Bank of Easton, 584 F.2d 1288, 1294 (3rd
Cir. 1978) (dictum limits aider and abettor liability to banks, holding them liable only
when bank officers were "insiders" in transaction).
77. See McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 207 (10th Cir. 1975) (holding that lia-
bility extends beyond developers).
78. See 15 U.S.C. § 1717 (1976); see Law v. Royal Palm Beach Colony, Inc., 578
F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1978) (vendee can rescind sale if not given property report prior to
sale).
79. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1704-1705 (1976).
80. See 24 C.F.R. § 1710.110 (1980). For example, "Special Risk Factors" must
be included in the property report stating that "the future value of land is very uncer-
tain; do not count on appreication." Id.
81. See 15 U.S.C. § 1707 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); 24 C.F.R. §§ 1710.101-.103,
1715.25 (1980).
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 1706 (1976 & Supp. 1111979).
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breaking the rules and to offer consumers some redress, it provides
both civil8 3 and criminal sanctions.84 Failure to comply with OILSR
rules may support a cause of action by a buyer or an OILSR suspen-
sion order.8"
If a buyer does not receive a property report, he or she may rescind
the sale whether or not the purchaser received the requisite informa-
tion by other means.86 Liability for fraud similarly attaches in con-
nection with a sale when a developer defrauds or obtains money by
material misrepresentation with respect to information in the state-
ment of record or property report or any other information pertinent
to the lot upon which the purchaser relies.87 Authorities do not, how-
ever, interpret the statute to impose liability upon a developer for
every omission; there is no affirmative duty to supply all material
information.88 Only that material information required in the regu-
lations need be included in seller statements and literature.89 The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Paquin v. Four Seasons of Tennes-
sese9° defined "material" information as that which a reasonable in-
vestor might have considered important in making a decision.9
83. Id § 1709(a), (b). See, e.g., United States v. Pocono In'l Corp., 378 F. Supp.
1265 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (cannot describe as suitable for homesite without misrepresent-
ing unless adequate sewage systems exist or will exist).
84. See 15 U.S.C. § 1717 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), providing for fine of up to
$5,000 or imprisonment of not more than five years or both. See United States v.
Steinhilber, 484 F.2d 386, 390 (8th Cir. 1973) (knowing violation required for convic-
tion).
85. See 15 U.S.C. § 1709 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
86. Rockefeller v. High Sky, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Penn. 1975). Addition-
ally, if the court finds no damage, vendee alleging developer violations may receive
nominal damages. Johnson v. Stephens Dev. Corp., 538 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1976).
87. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1703, 1709 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See, e.g., Bryan v.
Amrep Corp., 429 F. Supp. 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (reliance need not be proven for
liability under § 1703(a)(2)(A) and (C), but must be proven under § 1703(a)(2)(B)).
88. See, e.g., Husted v. Amrep Corp., 429 F. Supp. 298, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see
also Coffey & Welch, supra note 15, at 63.
89. See 24 C.F.R. § 1710.102()(2) (1980).
90. See 519 F.2d 1105, 1111, reh. denied, 522 F.2d 1270 (5th Cir. 1975) (though
Four Seasons Development Company was wholly owned by a bankrupt corporation,
the court held this fact not material).
91. Compare Paquin with TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448
(1976) (in securities law, the materiality test is whether a reasonable investor would
attach significance to the undisclosed fact. The importance of the distinction may be
exaggerated since it is unlikely that any jury would apply the standards differently).
The dissent in Pacquin sets out alternative applications of the materiality test. 519
F.2d at 1112.
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In addition to providing affirmative subjects of disclosure, regula-
tions promulgated in 1973 prohibit false or misleading advertising, 92
as well as certain unlawful sales practices.93 An extensive list pro-
vides standards for determining whether a statement is misleading.94
The OILSR recognized the need for advertisement regulations to
strengthen other anti-fraud provisions of the Act. To prevent a de-
veloper from subverting the Act by flooding the market with addi-
tional information that fails to meet the standards of truth required
for the property report and statement of record, the regulations re-
quire that all advertisements contain a disclaimer that HUD has not
approved the offering, and an advisement to obtain a HUD property
report.95 Additionally, all ads must be materially similar to the state-
ment of record and property report.96
D. Administration
Four divisions within the OILSR administer the Act by receiving
and checking registration statements, handling complaints, and es-
tablishing new regulations.97 Compliance with the Act is extremely
costly for developers due to the complexity of the requirements and
the need to prepare additional registration reports to meet state regis-
tration requirements. In addition to a maximum filing fee of one
thousand dollars, there are attorney and accountant fees, as well as
costs from delay.98 To avoid these fees, developers try to structure
92. See 24 C.F.R. § 1715.5-.15 (1980). The rules require sellers to be specific in
their representations so as not to mislead buyers. Eg., property cannot be called
"waterfront" without meeting specified criteria. Id § 1715.15(e). Consumers need
protection from deceptive advertising where market incentives insufficiently guaran-
tee disclosure of the truth. See generally Pitofsky, supra note 15.
93. 24 C.F.R. § 1715.25 (1980).
94. Section 1715.15 is actually applicable to both advertising and sales practices.
The rules treat implied representations and presumptions as positive assertions. Id
§ 1715.15(jj).
95. Id § 1715.10(a).
96. Id § 1715.5(a)(3).
97. Id § 1700.25; see Lynn v. Biderman, 536 F.2d 820, 825 (9th Cir. 1976) (Secre-
tary of HUD may secure information to serve as basis for further regulations). Upon
receipt of complaints, OILSR will attempt to negotiate compliance without recom-
mending adminstrative action. See Gandal, General Outline of the Interstate Land
Sales Full Disclosure Act, 3 REAL EST. L.J. 3, 6 (1974).
98. See Note, The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act." An Analysis of 4d-
minisitrative Policies Implemented in the Years 1968-1975, 26 CATH. U. L. REv. 348,
365 n.103 (1977). It commonly takes 60 to 70 days to complete the filing process.
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their deals within the regulatory exemptions;99 or, they submit prop-
erty reports prepared for state agencies which the OILSR has agreed
to accept in lieu of preparation of a separate federal report."°°
The Act also gives the OILSR latitude to enforce its rules through
its authority to hold administrative hearings and suspend interstate
sales.'' Additionally, the Secretary of HUD has the authority to
promulgate new rules and regulations as deemed appropriate.10 2
III. IMPLEMENTATION
Although Congress enacted ILSFDA in 1968,103 little public
awareness of the OILSR exists."° Notwithstanding public hearings
held in 1971105 and optimism that given a few years to establish itself
the OILSR would become as competent and effective as the SEC,10 6
ILSFDA has failed to fully protect consumers and the environment
from the harm and corrupton caused by subdividers. °7
It was not until 1972 that HUD reported its first three convictions
under ILSFDA.' 8 To date, there have been only fifteen more crimi-
nal convictions and a total of thirty-three injunctive cases brought.10 9
Rarely is a report perfect when first received. See Henderson Letter, supra note 3. In
fiscal year 1979, OILSR received $327,502 in funds collected from developers. See
Letter from OILSR to Renee Friedman (Mar. 18, 1980).
99. See 24 C.F.R. § 1710.13 (1980).
100. See, e.g., Happy Inv. Group v. Lakeworld Properties, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 175
(N.D. Cal. 1975).
101. See 15 U.S.C. § 1714(a)(b) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
102. Id § 1715.
103. The ILSFDA became effective April 28, 1969.
104. See Land Sales Boom--Let the Buyer Beware, 37 CONSUMER REP. 606
(1972). OILSR does not aggressively employ its investigatory powers. See Note,
supra note 13, at 516. Recent information does not alter this assessment. See Hen-
derson Letter, supra note 3.
105. See Klink & White, The Accountants Reshape the Retail Land Sales Industry,
3 REAL EST. REV. 47, 48 (1973).
106. See Note, supra note 19, at 138. See also Case & Jester, supra note 18, at
411.
107. Criminal enforcement actions brought by the OILSR from its inception
through December 31, 1979 have involved 23 companies and 64 individual defend-
ants. In February, 1979, OILSR estimated that buyers brought 139 private actions.
See Henderson Letter, supra note 3.
108. See 1972 HUD STATISTICAL YEARBOOK. Administrative action taken
against 207 developers led to suspension of sales in many cases.
109. Phone conversation with Chris Peterson, OILSR (Mar. 28, 1980). One rea-
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With a staff of eighty-six people, the agency cannot adequately police
the entire land sales industry." o
Recognizing its limitations, OILSR does not inspect subdivisions
or verify statements made in registration reports unless it has reason
to suspect inaccuracies. The agency tries to concentrate its minimal
resources to foster consumer awareness of the risks inherent in buy-
ing subdivision lots instead of vainly investigating developments for
fraud."1 ' As a result of this attitude, property reports may give buy-
ers false security by causing them to think they know all that is neces-
sary to make an intelligent purchase decision. Since OILSR has not
compared the buyer's particular site to the statements made in the
reports, this assumption is far from accurate."I2
Although OILSR has increased its enforcement activities against
son for infrequent prosecution may be the laxity with which subdividers respond to
questions in reports. Answers are so vague that they can mislead the buyer without
subjecting the developer to accusations of untruthfulness. See A. WOLFF, supra note
5, at 260-61.
As of September 30, 1978, OILSR received 9,162 filings representing 5,391,251 lots
and 4,980 claims for exemptions. Henderson Letter, supra note 3. See United States
v. Amrep, 545 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1976); Schenker v. United States, 529 F.2d 96 (9th
Cir. 1976).
110. Phone conversation with Chris Peterson, OILSR (Mar. 28, 1980). In 1978,
before a budget cutback, there were 106 staff persons. See Henderson Letter, supra
note 3. In fiscal year 1979, OILSR's received over 3,000 filings to examine. Phone
conversation with Chris Peterson, OILSR (Mar. 28, 1980). This figure represents a
decrease from fiscal year 1978 which produced 4,617 filings. See Henderson Letter,
supra note 3. The drop may be due to changes in the economy and the promulgation
of new regulations by OILSR. Phone conversation with Chris Peterson, OILSR
(Mar. 28, 1980).
OILSR investigates developers only after it receives consumer complaints, See For
Sale: Bad Deals in Land, CHANGING TIMES, Aug., 1977, at 13, 14. In 1975, only 40%
of the projects subject to the ILSFDA had been registered. See Case & Jester, supra
note 18, at 412. Apparently this situation is reversing as the OILSR becomes aware of
unregistered sites through its complaint process. Phone conversation with Chris Pe-
terson, OILSR (Mar. 28, 1980).
111. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NEED FOR IMPROVED CONSUMER PRO-
TECTION IN INTERSTATE LAND SALES 34 (1973). In calendar year 1979, OILSR re-
ceived approximately 16,300 complaints, inquiries, and developer responses. Phone
conversation with Chris Peterson, OILSR (Mar. 28, 1980). This number is far too
large for any agency the size of the OILSR to handle.
112. E.g., one corporation represented in a report that it is understood that ade-
quate water existed through all lots yet it never stated the basis of this understanding.
In reality, water lines existed through only two of the lots. See A. WOLFF, supra note
5, at 91-92.
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developers since 1976,113 the agency has not yet achieved effective
regulation. As HUD's major concern traditionally has been to en-
courage and promote real estate development, rather than to police
it," subdivision enforcement poses a new and administratively diffL-
cult situation.
IV. EVALUATION
A. ILSFDA Compared with Securities Law
As a full disclosure act, ILSFDA contains many flaws. Reports
required by the Act confuse many potential purchasers by their com-
plexity, rather than offering any valuable information."'
The ILSFDA, although patterned after securities law, does not
cover land purchasers as extensively as the SEC protects securities
buyers. HUD, unlike the SEC, has no experience in protecting inves-
tors against financial risk; rather, it is mainly concerned with the
quality of housing. Unlike the Securities Act of 1933,116 ILSFDA
limits its liability to developers" 17 rather than extending to "any per-
son" involved in the illegality."' Further, no liability attaches to a
developer who uses fraudulent statements outside the scope of the
written reports unless the buyer proves reliance." 9 The Act thus
113. E.g., during 1977, OILSR conducted 1,000 "rescission exercises" in which a
seller must notify buyers of their right to rescind. By this process consumers regained
S162 million. See P. SIMKO, supra note 1, at 390. In addition, OILSR discovered 993
unregistered subdivisions and issued over 300 suspension orders. See Henderson Let-
ter, supra note 3.
114. Dealing with subdivisions distracts HUD and is counterproductive to its de-
veloper orientation. See A. WOLFF, supra note 5, at 262.
115. See P.SIMKO, supra note 1, at 34. They are too long and often too complex
for laypeople. Unlike the prospectus requirement of the SEC, the OILSR enforces no
clarity requirement for reports even though the need is greater than in the securities
field where there is an information filtration system between seller and buyer. See
Coffey & Welch, supra note 15, at 18-19; Note, Accountants Financial Disclosure and
Inuestors' Remedies, 18 N.Y. L.F. 681 (1973).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
117. Id at § 1703 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Liability likewise does not arise for
"offering" to sell land without a statement of record. Id Yet, under securities law,
violations can occur if an issuer offers to sell prior to "filing" a registration statement.
Id at § 77(1).
118. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1703(b) with id. § 77(1).
119. See note 87 and accompanying text supra. It is unclear, however, whether
proof of reliance is needed to assert a violation for misleading advertising under the
amended rules. See notes 92-94 and accompanying text supra.
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gives little more than common law tort protection when misstate-
ments occur outside the scope of mandated reports.120 Under federal
securities law, sellers are liable for fraudulent misrepresentations
even if they receive exemptions from registration. 121 The ILSFDA,
however, limits its anti-fraud provisions to those developments which
must register.' 2
2
The major defect of ILSFDA relative to the Securities Act is its
failure to prohibit pure omissions.' 2 3 If a developer complies with all
atfrmative disclosure requirements without misstatement, the omis-
sion of a material factor not specifically requiring inclusion does not
result in liability.'2 4 Clearly, the Act's failure to deal with material
omissions inhibits equalized information between parties.1
2 5
If Congress is serious about controlling land sale problems, the
SEC, rather than HUD, should take administrative responsibility for
the Act. Congress should also amend ILSFDA to provide the same
insurance for full disclosure that the 1933 securities law offers inves-
tors. 126 Presently, investors in real estate corporate securities receive
more information than buyers of the land. 127 Yet sophisticated in-
vestors, unlike land buyers, do not need the information quite as des-
perately.' 28
120. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 256 (1972).
121. See 15 U.S.C. § 780) (1976).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1703 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
123. A pure omission is the absence of a statement concerning a material fact.
See Coffey & Welch, supra note 15, at 63.
124. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
125. Cf. Section 10(b)(5) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA) for
language regulating pure omissions. 15 U.S.C. § 780) (1976).
126. The land buyer tends to be less sophisticated than the securities investor and
thus needs as much protection as, if not more than, a security buyer. Indeed, security
transactions are typically conducted for consumers by sophisticated brokers, expert in
the market and able to interpret the complex prospectuses required by the SEC. Buy-
ers of subdivided land, on the other hand, purchase directly from developers and
therefore do not avail themselves of expert advice.
127. Many real estate limited partnership interests come under the regulatory pur-
view of the SEC, which has more comprehensive reporting requirements than
ILSFDA. See Dahlik, Real Estate Partnerships and the Securities Laws: A Primer, 12
CREIGHTON L. REv. 781 (1979).
128. See, e.g., Davis v. Rio Ranch Estates, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1045, 1049 (S.D.
N.Y. 1975) (buyer of subdivision lot held unprotected by securities laws although
lawyer treated purchase as investment). See generall, United Hous. Foundation, Inc.
v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
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It is curious that courts have not applied securities law concepts to
most land purchases.129 One explanation is that courts may view
ILSFDA as sufficient to protect land purchasers without resort to the
federal securities law.' 3 ' While generally expanding the number of
transactions that will be considered a "security," 3 I courts have taken
a myopic approach to the economic realities involved in selling
land.'32 The Supreme Court has held that securities laws exist for the
protection of persons who invest money seeking capital return. 133
Money paid for a home or homesite does not fall within the Court's
definition of such an investment.' 34 Despite the Court's interpreta-
tion of land purchase motives, in one survey seventy percent of pro-
spective customers reported that they were primarly interested in
purchasing for investment rather than enjoyment purposes. 35
Securities laws protect investors who give control of their money to
the enterprise of another. The investor typically has no direct access
to information about the enterprise upon which his profit and return
of capital depend. Since a security is worth only as much as the en-
terprise, the investor's risk is completely in the hands of those who
conduct the enterprise. 36 The securities laws provide protection by
insuring that investors receive all pertinent information concerning
the underlying enterprise.
129. Professor Coffey expressed the belief that someday land sales would come
under the federal securities umbrella. See Coffey & Welch, supra note 15, at 13.
Several states already consider real estate transactions of this type as securities trans-
actions. Eg., FLA. STAT. § 163.260-.270 (1976); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 337 (Mc-
Kinney 1968 & 1978-79 Supp.); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707 (Page 1980).
130. One of the factors used to determine whether a transaction will be labeled a
"security" is the purchasers' need for the type of protections that are offered under
securities laws. See generally Coffey & Welch, supra note 15. Courts that believe the
ILSFDA meets this need are less likely to find a "security."
131. See Case&Jester, supra note 18, at 411.
132. For a court's ironic application of economic realities to this question, see
Happy Inv. Group v. Lakeworld Props., Inc., 396 F. Supp. 175, 179-80 (N.D. Cal.
1975) (although purchasers relied upon defendants to create a viable recreational sub-
division, and the sales literature represented the purchase as an investment, the court
held that the transaction did not constitute sale of a security).
133. See United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (resi-
dents' interests in cooperative housing project not a security).
134. See Happy Inv. Group v. Lakeworld Props., 396 F. Supp. 175, 180-81 (N.D.
Cal. 1975).
135. See TAsK FORCE ON LAND UsE, supra note 3, at 266; Fogel v. SellAmerica,
Ltd., 445 F. Supp. 1269, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
136. See SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) for the elements of a "security".
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Analogously, purchasers of land depend on the seller to install im-
provements which give value to otherwise worthless property. 'The
real "value" to the purchaser is not in the raw land, but in an im-
proved subdivision development. 137 The lot buyer, like the securities
investor, gives money to the developer's enterprise and stands to risk
that entire amount on the hope that the enterprise is successful. Sell-
ers of subdivision lots often finance the cost of improvements through
sales revenue, making the success of the buyer dependent upon the
seller's solvency. As the securities/land development analogy illus-
trates, buyers in both situations are unaware of the underlying enter-
prise of the issuer/developer; they give money to others, and bear the
risk if it is lost.138
The above transactional elements, which typically define the exist-
ence of a security, should be applied to land sales. If the government
did not regulate securities, authorities would fear the deleterious ef-
fects on the capital market. Similarly, unregulated land sales have
had a major adverse effect upon the environment, consumers, and
land prices. 139 Unfortunately, the land sales industry, through its
lobbying efforts, continues to impede the addition of helpful regula-
tions which would put ILSFDA on par with federal securities
laws. 140
The wide scope of permitted exemptions also contributes to
ILSFDA's weakness by allowing developers to avoid registration.
Despite section 1702(a) of the Act,' which prohibits exemptions
designed to evade the Act's intent, the OILSR does not sufficiently
curtail the use of exemptions to prevent ardent abuses.'4 2 Limiting
137. See Comment, supra note 31, at 267.
138. See Coffey & Welch, supra note 15, at 20; Comment, Applying the Interstate
Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 51 OR. L. REV. 381, 391 (1972).
139. Premature subdivisions have spawned catastrophic development plans.
Comment, State Securities Regulation of Interstate Land Sales, 10 URBAN L. ANN.
271 (1975).
140. See Coffey & Welch, supra note 15, at 39. OILSR still does not require de-
velopers to reveal all pertinent facts needed by a buyer. See, e.g., Campbell v. Glacier
Park Co., 381 F. Supp. 1243 (D. Idaho 1974) (no violation for developer who changes
plans in contravention of sales contract following sale). OILSR could, but does not,
require developers to disclose information regarding.the property's actual value. See
TASK FORCE ON LAND USE, supra note 3, at 178.
141. 15 U.S.C. § 1702(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
142. See Note, Consumer Protection and the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure
Act, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 947, 948 (1974); Case & Jester, supra note 18, at 434.
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the availability of exemptions would further aid enforcement akin to
that rendered under securities laws.
B. Inadequacy of Full Disclosure to Solve the Problems
Initially, Congress justified the cost of requiring disclosure, claim-
ing that legitimate developers already spent similar amounts in pre-
paring reports. 143  Legitimate businesses, therefore, could not
compete with less scrupulous sellers who refused to bear such cost
unless required by law. Many developers now feel that they are re-
quired to disclose far too much information resulting in high compli-
ance costs which translate into higher consumer prices. 1 4 Much of
the information is of no help to the buyer, who would much rather
save money than pay for useless information.14
5
Even if full disclosure could adequately control consumer
problems, legislation which purports to cure the evils of the land sales
industry must adequately address the adverse environmental effects
of subdividing land. Strict regulations are needed to compel the land
sales industry to meet standards required in the Urban Growth and
New Community Act of 1970146 to assure nondestructive planned
land use.
The Supreme Court drastically narrowed ILSFDA's potential to
prevent land abuse when it decided Flint Ridge Development Co. v.
Scenic Rivers Association.147 The Court's conclusion in Flint Ridge
was that HUD has no obligation to conduct environmental impact
studies before approving registration.' 48 ILSFDA strictly requires
HUD to approve registration within thirty days of proper filing to
protect developers from costly delays; the Court found such a limited
143. See Coffey & Welch, rupra note 15, at 20.
144. Id at 54. Compliance is difficult since OILSR does not preempt the various
state laws requiring different information. Many developers do not even understand
what the law requires of them. See Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-
Recent Assaults upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REv. 541, 572 (1961).
145. See Pridgen, The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act: The Practitioner's
Problems d Suggestions for Improvement, 4 REAL EST. L. J. 127, 134-35 (1975-76);
Note, Reguladon of Interstate Land Sales, 25 STAN. L. REv. 605, 621 (1973).
146. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4501-4532 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See Note, suyra note 13, at
526.
147. 426 U.S. 776 (1976).
148. Id at 791. The court noted that the National Environmental Protection Act
(NEPA) requires the preparation of EIS's on all federal actions significantly affecting
the quality of the environment. Id at 785.
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period inadequate in which to prepare an environmental impact
statement. 49 Although the Secretary of HUD may use its rulemak-
ing authority to demand that developers provide an impact statement
as part of the full disclosure requirement, the Court said that a court
may not force HUD to do this.' 50 Industry pressures and HUD's
lack of aggressiveness have prevented the addition of meaningful reg-
ulations of this type. 5 ' Whereas the OILSR may receive some infor-
mation on environmental factors, no requirements are
comprehensive in this respect. In any event, the agency cannot with-
hold registration soley because a development plan would injure the
environment.
Although the OILSR's performance may not appear successful, it
is hard to realistically estimate the full impact of ILSFDA in control-
ling land sale abuses. The deterrent value served by the Act's provi-
'sions may have saved consumers from potential abuse. Additionally,
the threat of suit may be responsible for favorable settlements in
favor of purchasers.' 52 Even if purchasers or the OILSR do not in-
vestigate statements made, a developer may face investigation and
prosecution by state agencies having stricter guidelines than the
OILSR.' 53 In any event, the present situation in the land sales indus-
try has certainly improved somewhat since passage of ILSFDA gave
buyers a better chance to protect themselves.' 5 4
149. 426 U.S. at 790-91. Where there is an agency conflict, NEPA gives way to
the ILSFDA. Id at 788.
150. See Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Hills, 420 F. Supp. 582
(D. Colo. 1976).
151. See Case & Jester, supra note 18, at 419-20, 432.
152. Id at 441-42.
153. See Coffey & Welch, supra note 15, at 64. Many states possess authority to
suspend sales of developments characterized as unfair. Under the ILSFDA, an ag-
grieved buyer may have a valid cause of action, whereas he could not prove the ele-
ments of an action in common law deceit. Note, supra note 19, at 136-37.
154. Cf. Pitofsky, supra note 15, at 664 (until the government intervened and re-
quired disclosure, accurate information was unavailable in many product areas.
Thus, consumers may feel less impelled to look out for themselves, knowing a federal
agency is involved in registering the development).
The government can never ensure total protection; it cannot require disclosure of
all information connected with a transaction. By determining what consumers most
need to know and requiring disclosure of those factors, the government helps ensure
that the market will function efficiently. See Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure
Regulation in Consumer Transactions, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 400, 423.
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C. Achievement of Purpose
If the ultimate purpose of ILSFDA were merely to equalize infor-
mation between buyer and seller, the Act could have the potential for
great success. 55 With added regulations requiring more disclosures
and better resources for enforcement so that the OILSR would func-
tion more like the SEC, the Act could provide potential purchasers
with all material information. 156
The underlying purpose of the ILSFDA, however, made clear by
the corresponding purposes of achieving both rational purchase deci-
sions and environmentally sound uses of land,'57 is to change con-
sumer behavior. Despite their distaste for paternalism, the drafters
conceded that protection naturally results from disclosure. Notwith-
standing the presence of increased information due to ILSFDA, how-
ever, the statute does not achieve wholesale protection and rational
uses of land. Only substantive regulations can achieve full protec-
tion;'5 I although full disclosure imparts knowledge, it does not insure
that the receiver will understand or act upon it.' 59 Consumers buy,
regardless of unfavorable information, convinced that real estate can-
not be a bad investment."'° If this problem was of such severity that
Congress enacted disclosure regulations, Congress should now con-
sider other legislative action to remedy ILSFDA's unsolved
problems.' 61 Even if the need for substantive regulation is recog-
nized, however, the wisdom of such regulation will remain open for
155. See Note, supra note 142, at 956 (the intent of the act was to eliminate igno-
rance, not poor judgment).
156. See Note, supra note 106, at 136.
157. See Law v. Royal Palm Beach Colony, Inc., 578 F. 2d 98, 99 (5th Cir. 1978)
(action by land purchaser against lender for rescission).
158. The most effective state laws are those having substantive regulations. Eg.,
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 11000-11030 (West 1964 & Supp. 1977).
159. See L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 35 (2d ed. 1961). A former OILSR
administrator, George Bernstein, realized this and suggested that the federal govern-
ment seek more quantitative regulation if the states failed to increase their regulation
of the industry. See Gose, Interstate Land Sales, 9 REAL PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 7,
10, 39 (1974).
160. See P. SIMKO, supra note 1, at 34. Cf. Whitford, supra note 154, at 417 (the
purpose of truth-in-lending legislation is not simply to disseminate information, but
rather "to pioduce a greater degree of cost-effective comparative shopping" and to
"affect decisions whether to enter credit transactions at all").
161. Having purportedly valid regulations on the books makes it easy for devel-
opers to convince buyers that they are investing in a good deal. See A. WOLFF, supra
note 5, at 236-40.
1980]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
speculation given the federal government's previous record on con-
sumer regulation and the possible impropriety of a paternalistic role
for government. 16
2
V. ALTERNATIVES TO ILSFDA
Current legislation gives no single federal agency control over all
the variables necessary to insure rational land development. 163 Any
substantive legislation must create meaningful standards and simul-
taneously allow for individual community needs.164 At present, there
is no policy agreement as to what these standards should be.' Al-
though local governments possess the authority to regulate subdivi-
sion development,' 6 6 they lack the resources and expertise to
formulate and administer meaningful controls.'67 In addition to dis-
162. Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 309-11 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (national standards would not solve economic problems; let the market
control rather than man).
163. See D. MANDELKER, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT:
CASES AND MATERIALS 128, 281, 812, 821 (1979) [hereinafter cited as D.
MANDELKER]; 42 U.S.C. § 4501 (Supp. III 1979) (The National Urban Policy and
New Community Development Act calls for a national policy to guide specific deci-
sions affecting patterns of development).
164. Usually land use plans have resulted after private initiative has predeter-
mined the policy. See P. SIMKO, supra note 1, at 33.
165. See Tarlock, Not in 4cordance with a Comprehensive Plan: .4 Case Study of
Regional Shopping Center Location Conflicts in Lexington, Kentucky, 1970 URBAN L.
ANN. 133, 169-73 (American land use controls evidence a faith in the market to
achieve an optimum allocation, thereby precluding the need for governmental land
use planning).
Lack of demand for undeveloped land may justify refusal to allow development
unless proper assurances are made that development will occur in the future because
of need.
166. Some jurisdictions that have a comprehensive plan also have "consistency
provisions." See AM. Soc'Y PLAN. OFFICIALS, LOCAL CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT AND
MANAGEMENT 61 (HUD Office of Policy Development and Research, 1977). Using
zoning law to regulate land use provides another method of control. See Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.
2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). While police power is broad, it is not unlimited. Re-
fusal of the right to develop may be an unconstitutional regulation. See French Inv.
Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976). Yet,
justification for such regulation may exist if the controls make the property owner
bear the negative costs of poor development which decrease the value of his land
rather than conferring a "benefit" on society.
167. See P. SIMKO, supra note 1, at 58. See also Mandelker, The Role of Law in
the Planning Process, 1965 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 26, 32. Many local governments
allow large-scale development when promoters convince community businessmen
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cretionary mechanisms 68 such as the use of environmental impact
statements to determine feasibility of a development project, a com-
prehensive plan must guide land use decisions.
169
Federal preemptive legislation or adoption of a new uniform land
sales act would offer uniformity over the existing variety of compli-
ance standards which confuse developers and escalate costs for pur-
chasers. 170 Due to the extensive expertise and care used in drafting a
uniform act, the rights and obligations of the buyer and seller are
more likely to be satisfactorily addressed. 17  Preemption of land
sales regulations with substantive federal controls would supply a ho-
listic approach to the problem.' 72 Alternatively, federal law could
establish minimum standards to govern subdivided land sales, grant-
ing each state enforcement authority and power to promulgate
stricter standards. To formulate the content of these regulations,
Congress might employ the experience gained by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC)173 as well as states' 74 which have adopted sub-
and officials that the community will benefit from development. Inexperienced, and
influenced by color pictures and promises, local governments approve subdivisions
without full realization of the ramifications of their decision upon the future. Jones,
Selling the Mileage: A Nice Piece of Desert, 213 NATION 616, 622 (1971). Local gov-
ernments must provide costly services for these developments that tax the entire es-
tablished community. See TASK FORCE ON LAND USE, supra note 3, at 279.
168. Presently, local land use controls place primary reliance on discretionary
mechanisms. See TASK FORCE ON LAND USE, supra note 3, at 189.
169. If controls are too discretionary, they lack force of law and lack public ac-
ceptance if there are no shared value judgments. See D. MANDELKER, THE ZONING
DILEMMA 32 (1971); TASK FORCE ON LAND USE, supra note 3, at 27. If a plan exists
to curtail discretion, it must be consistent with the values of those given the power of
enforcement. If they are inconsistent with administrator's values, biases will guide the
discretionary review rather than the plan's real intention. See generally Tarlock,
supra note 165.
170. See Coffey & Welch, supra note 15, at 17. Federal preemption, however, is
not a realistic possibility given the legislative trends in the area. The Uniform Land
Sales Act currently is in use in 9 states. See notes 190-207 and accompanying text
infra for an explanation of possible improvements of this Act.
171. See the prefatory note to the Uniform Condominium Act in 7 UNIFORM
LAWS ANNOTATED 97 (West 1978).
172. To date, congressional efforts to legislate a national land use law have failed.
See generally P. SIMKO, supra note 1.
173. Section 45(a)(1) of the FTC Act states that "unfair methods of competition in
or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce, are declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(1) (West Supp. 1980).
The FTC may use cease-and-desist orders to prevent persons from employing de-
ceptive practices. Id at § 45(b). A developer who violates an order may be subject to
civil penalties. Id at § 45(m)(l)(A).
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stantive legislation.
A. The FTC Example
Presently, the FTC handles many problems within the scope of the
OILSR. Just as OILSR has authority to investigate promoters of
subdivision lots, the FTC has powers to order the preparation of re-
ports by sellers.'75 Civil penalty provisions exist for deception,'76
and criminal penalties for willful, false advertisement.' 77
The FTC has begun to exercise its powers to control deceptive
practices in the land sales area and has achieved more success than
the OILSR. Beginning in 1973, the FTC prohibited developers from
misleading buyers;178 one year later, consumers recovered nearly sev-
enteen million dollars in payments which they had forfeited as liqui-
dated damages.
179
Additionally, the FTC ordered substantive changes in promoter
practices, going well beyond OILSR protection. The buyer receives a
ten-day cooling-off period to rescind his contract, and the seller must
clearly disclose risk factors' 80 as well as other material information
just as the SEC requires under Rule lOb-5 to prevent omissions. 18 1
When contracts represent the existence of improvements not actually
supplied, the FTC's consent orders occasionally provide for specific
performance.' 82 In one of their most substantive rulings, the FTC
decided that a contract was unfair when it had been signed under
174. See text accompanying notes 190-207 infra.
175. 15 U.S.C.A. § 46(a) (West Supp. 1980).
176. Id § 45(a)(1).
177. Id § 50.
178. See In re Urban Redev., Inc., 83 F.T.C. 692 (1973) (consent order to cease
and desist advertising nonexistent improvements).
179. In re GAC Corp., 84 F.T.C. 163 (1974). See In re ITT Corp., 88 F.T.C. 933,
949 (1976) (buyer cannot lose more than 44.8% of purchase price as liquidated dam-
ages).
180. See In re Las Animas Ranch, Inc., 89 F.T.C. 255, 275 (1977). The FTC
issued an order requiring the promoter of a risky development project to disclose that
the investment was "speculative and risky" and "unlikely to increase in value" or be
marketable. Cavanaugh Corp., [1977] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 23,177.
181. See In re Horizon Corp., 85 F.T.C. 1021 (1975).
182. See, e.g., In re ITT Corp., 88 F.T.C. 933 (1976). See also Flagg Indus., 90
F.T.C. 226 (1977) (required developer to make $4.1 million in improvements); In re
Great Western United Corp., [1977] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,261 ($4,000,000
ordered in cash refunds for misrepresentation of site as an investment and $16 million
commitment ordered for capital improvements). Generally, it is difficult to act
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circumstances in which it was improbable that the buyer would read
or understand the sales documents. 83 This decision recognized the
difference between providing a buyer with information and making
sure that he or she can act upon it.
Although the aforementioned remedies are more extensive than
those of OILSR, FTC weaknesses prevent it from adequately dealing
with land sale problems. Administration under the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTCA) is very slow;' 84 thus, the Commission can-
not act prophylactically to protect potential buyers. Even though the
FTC has recovered large sums of money for consumers, the total rep-
resents a small portion of the actual losses suffered.'8 5 No private
right of action to recover damages exists under the FTCA, and the
FTC deals only with cases having a potential impact on a large
number of persons.'8 6 Thus, the cheated individual may have no le-
gal recourse.
In spite of its authority to promulgate regulations specifically ap-
plicable to the land sales industry, the FTC has not done so.' 8 7 The
rulemaking process is time-consuming and costly. In view of the
OILSR's responsibility for policing the land industry,8 8 it is unlikely
that the FTC will use its own scarce resources to take over another
agency's work and issue a Trade Rule Regulation (TRR) for land
sales.' 89
B. State Controls
In addition to the FTC, several states have effective substantive
enforcement rules. Some states regulate land sales under their Blue
Sky securities laws which allow the securities administrator to refuse
registration if a developer's plan is unfair.19° Under the Minnesota
against false advertising since the campaign is usually over and has done its damage
by the time that a cease and desist order issues.
183. See In re GAC Corp., 84 F.T.C. 163 (1974). See also Bankers Life and Cas.
Co., [1976] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 21,253.
184. Administrative hearings take at least thirty days and the FTC lacks the staff
and funds to police its rulings. Coffey & Welch, supra note 15, at 11-12.
185. See For Sale: Bad Deals in Land, CHANGING TIMES, Aug., 1977, at 14.
186. See 16 C.F.R. § 2.3 (1980).
187. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1976).
188. See P. SIMKO, supra note 1, at 57.
189. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 52 with 15 U.S.C. § 57a. See also St. Louis Post-Dis-
patch, Apr. 6, 1980, at 13A.
190. See, e.g., OHIO RE. CODE ANN. § 1707.01-.33 (Page 1980) (includes real
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Subdivided Land Sales Practices Act, 19 the state will not register a
subdivision unless the developer shows compliance with zoning laws
and environmental standards, an ability to convey clear title, and that
it will complete needed improvements. t
92
New York has creatively adapted traditional land use controls to
defer development in relation to the availability of public facilities by
means of phased expansion. 193 If a residential developer wants to
subdivide, the lots have to be near required facilities, or else the town
may deny permission to develop. 194
New York law also provides for the evaluation of environfilental
factors' 95 in similar fashion to an EIS, and prohibits the sale of
worthless land.' 96 Employees of New York's Department of State
personally inspect every subdivision prior to approval, requiring the
posting of performance bonds sufficient to improve the land.'
97
California law is in some respects the most progressive of any state
regulation. Finding full disclosure legislation an inadequate solution
to the land sales problems, California enacted additional substantive
estate outside of the state in its definition of security). See also Case & Jester, supra
note 18, at 398. Even though the state may disapprove of an issuer on substantive
grounds, Ohio does not represent that any deal is safe. Devoe v. State, 48 Ohio App.
311, 357 N.E.2d 396 (1975).
191. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 83.20-.42 (West Cum. Supp. 1980).
192. Id § 83.23.
193. See Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d
138 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972) (if the developer failed to provide
improvements, the town had to provide the required facilities over an 18-year period
in any case). Ramapo may not now be good law due to a change in justices on the
New York high court; the dissenting judge now is Chief Justice. See AM. Soc'v OF
PLAN. OFFICIALS, LOCAL CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT & MANAGEMENT 64 (HUD Office
of Policy Development, 1977). See also Horizon Adirondack Corp. v. N.Y., 88 Misc.
2d 619, 388 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
194. Permits are issued on the basis of points awarded for the availability of serv-
ices. See P. SIMKO, supra note 1, at 330.
195. See N.Y. ENVT'L CONSERV. L. § 3-0301(l)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
Contra for federal projects, Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n 426 U.S. 776
(1976), reh. denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976).
In Ton-da-Lay v. Diamond, 44 A.D. 2d 430,436, 355 N.Y.S.2d 820, 826 (1974), reh.
denied, 362 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1974), decided on other grounds, the court stated that regu-
lations under the law must provide a developer with sufficient information concerning
-what he must do to comply. This is often hard to accomplish.
196. See N.Y. ENVT'L CONSERV. L. § 3-0301(l)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
197. See M. PAULSON, supra note 4, at 169.
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requirements. 9 8 Aside from requiring affirmative disclosure of the
land's fair market value, the law treats the transaction like that of a
security. 199 The Commissioner of Real Estate has authority to deny
issuing a property report if the promoter cannot finance the adver-
tised improvement, if the land cannot be used for the stated purpose,
or if the sale would constitute misrepresentation, deceit or fraud.2 °"
As in New York, the state inspects all the property; in California,
however, a development may not receive approval if its costs are ex-
cessive.2 ° '
Because of those strict regulations, which relate exclusively to land
outside the state, relatively few real estate deals are marketed in Cali-
fornia.20 2 Notwithstanding its strict rules aimed at consumer protec-
tion, the California Subdivided Lands Act offers no controls over the
environmental impact that a development may have2"3 and provides
weak sanctions.2" Perhaps this is due to the consumer protection
purpose of the California law; the land that California law affects is
not located within the State of California, and California has little
interest or jurisdiction in controlling out-of-state environmental fac-
tors.
Using the New York and Minnesota models, with added Califor-
nia-type consumer protection laws, states could improve the land
sales situation in the absence of federal preemptive legislation. State
initiative, however, is unrealistic; although problems concerning land
sales continue, only the few states mentioned have adopted meaning-
ful legislation. These facts, coupled with the unsuccessful results
achieved under federal control,2 "5 suggest that regulaton should fol-
198. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 11000-11030 (West Supp. 1980). See also
Note, supra note 13, at 522.
199. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10237.1(c) (West Supp. 1980).
200. Also, zoning must be compatible with use, and adequate erosion and flood
prevention plans must be provided. Id at § 11025.3.
201. See, e.g., Towne Dev. Co. v. Lee, 63 Cal. 2d 147, 403 P.2d 724, 45 Cal. Rptr.
316 (1965) (sum constituted adequate and fair consideration for land).
202. See generall A. WOLFF, supra note 5.
203. Contra, N.Y. ENVT'L CONSERV. L. § 3-0301(l)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1979-
1980).
204. See TASK FORCE ON LAND USE, supra note 3, at 624.
205. Presently the OILSR attempts to enforce the Act on a budget of only $2.539
million and a staff ceiling of 86 persons. Letter from Director Weaver, OILSR to
Renee Friedman (Mar. 13, 1980).
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low a federal delegation model.2" 6 Under this approach federal law
would authorize each state to adopt and administer its own subdivi-
sion regulations through a permit system meeting federal minimum
requirements. States would receive federal grants to implement their
programs over which they would maintain exclusive jurisdiction. If a
state failed to promulgate a satisfactory plan, federal requirements
similar to the New York, Minnesota, and California models would
preempt any existing state laws regulating the area. The threat of
federal preemption and the thought of federal funding should pro-
vide adequate incentives for each state to implement its own plans
taking advantage of the state's ability to tailor federal minimum re-
quirements to meet its unique needs.207
VI. CONCLUSION
Any meaningful legislation should prevent land sales which do not
insure development of habitable communities. Even if a buyer re-
ceives all pertinent sales information, he or she may not use it when
deciding to buy. Emotional factors interfere with rational buying de-
cisions, especially when developers feed such feelings. Where there is
irrational decisionmaking, the market will not yield economic land
use.208 Regulations must provide guidane for efficient, nondestruc-
tive land use. Sensible rules will not jeopardize legitimate develop-
ments.
The public has begun to realize that the caveat "buyer beware"
will not protect the environment or people from greedy promoters
who will sell anything they can get someone to buy.20 9 Unless the
government helps to conserve land for proper uses, the land will be
unable to support future needs.210 And unless government concerns
itself with consumer use of disclosed information rather than solely
206. Examples of legislation adopting this approach include: Air Pollution and
Control Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410 (West Supp. 1980); Surface Mining Control and Rec-
lamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1252-63 (Supp. III 1979).
To an extent, existing federal environmental controls regulate subdivisions in this
way, for example, by prohibiting coastal subdivision development in some areas.
207. Cf. statutes cited in note 206 supra. These acts give effect to the notion that
states are best able to regulate pollution and mining because of their localized nature.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401(a)(3) (West Supp. 1980).
208. Cf. Tarlock, supra note 165, at 179 (ideas applied to shopping center location
as a response to controlling market conditions).
209. See P. SIMKO, supra note 1, at 310.
210. Id at 9.
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with its dissemination, promoters will get richer at the hands of gulli-
ble but innocent buyers.2 ' Legislators, however, consistent with the
American political tradition, are not inclined to promulgate laws
which impede consumer choice in the absence of fraud.2"2
Fairness should govern a national or state land use policy designed
to protect investors in land just as some state Blue Sky laws already
offer standards to insulate unsophisticated security investors from
harm. The free enterprise system will not collapse under paternalistic
regulations; they have worked well in several states already. To the
contrary, preservation of an economic system depends on the protec-
tion it offers against abuse.21 3
211. Cf. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. 521 (1934) (Investors in
securities do not receive protection through full disclosure laws alone. Speculative
profits are so enticing that rational decisions based on information cannot be guaran-
teed.) (The late Justice Douglas had been Director of the S.E.C.).
212. See note 7 supra concerning the philosophical basis of our political tradition.
213. See M. PAULSON, supra note 4, at introduction.
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